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From Reluctant Champion to Development
Ringmaster: Managing the Expanding Mission
of the World Bank
JANE RUEGER*
INTRODUCTION
In the last decade, the World Bank has catapulted from relative obscurity in
its work to alleviate global poverty to centrality in the latest controversies over
development, economic interdependence, and the global economy. Since its
inception at the Bretton Woods Conference in 1944, the Bank has attempted to
assist poor countries in developing the infrastructure they need to prosper in the
world economy. The Bank's original mission was based on pure economic and
macroeconomic reform. Through its experience in implementing this mission,
however, the Bank has learned more about the nature of development and the
many and various inputs necessary to achieve it. As a result, the Bank's mission
has broadened significantly.
"There is probably nothing in this world more political than money."1 After
the Cold War was won by the proponents of free trade principles, the political
spotlight fell upon the World Bank as the premier multilateral institution de-
voted to international aid. As understanding about the nature of development
grew, developed countries and NGOs increased pressure on the Bank to expand
its mission to include not only macroeconomic reform, but also reform in other
social and political arenas such as human rights, protection of the environment
and cultural heritage, and establishment of legal institutions. At the same time,
the Bank's own difficult experience further motivated it to expand its mission to
accommodate these new areas of development assistance.
Greater pressure from developed countries such as the United States and
the swift expansion of the World Bank's mission have made the Bank's policies
a focal point for criticism and discussion about the direction of international aid
* J.D. Candidate, 2003, Indiana University School of Law-Bloomington; M.B.A. Candidate,
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in development. Some critics find that the World Bank has strayed too far from
its macroeconomic underpinnings, and should rein itself in to focus on the areas
of its original core competencies. Others, noting the rather dismal record of
World Bank assistance based solely on economic kinds of reform, believe that
the Bank necessarily must expand its function to be of any use at all to the global
community; these observers suggest that the Bank continue on its path toward a
"holistic" approach to development and poverty reduction.
The questions facing the World Bank today are not new. Though an insti-
tution of a wholly different character, the British East India Company (the Com-
pany) faced many of the same organizational problems, transforming from a
generally ignored conglomeration of merchants seeking profit in the spice trade
into the British Empire's administrative agency in India. In its rise to promi-
nence and later its decline, the Company became a key figure in the imperialist
drive toward colonialism in the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries, and has
become a well-known symbol for the prevailing mercantilist thought of the
time. Soon after its beginnings as one of several private European trade con-
glomerates formed to explore the spice trade in the East Indies, the Company
came under enormous pressure from the British government to compete with
other European trade companies for trade routes and political influence in Asia.
Over the Company's two hundred year existence, the British Empire and prev-
alent imperialist thought pushed the Company to expand its mission to fit the
Empire's colonial goals, until, its mission expanded beyond manageable bounds,
the Company ceased to be a trading company at all. Finally, the British Empire
molded the Company into an administrative agent for the Empire's colonial
aspirations in India.
Expansion of the Company's mission, driven by the ideological thrust of im-
perialism and the prevailing political economic theory of mercantilism, became
both necessary for its survival and also the reason for its transformation into a
bloated administrative agency. The World Bank potentially faces a similar di-
lemma. Having started as a bank concerned with purely economic reform, the
Bank has been pushed by developed countries and NGOs to address and be ac-
countable for numerous humanitarian concerns involved in its loan projects.
Though the Bank has learned over the years that the humanitarian aspects of
development aid must be addressed to bring about meaningful change, the Bank
risks expanding its mission beyond manageable limits by championing these nu-
merous and potentially conflicting causes in development.
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This article will analyze the history and development of both the Company
and the World Bank, and from the comparison will draw an important lesson
for the World Bank: though some expansion of its mission may in current cir-
cumstances be necessary for its continued relevance, over-expansion beyond the
Bank's capabilities will be destructive to the organization itself, and will ulti-
mately undermine its effectiveness in assisting development. Part I begins with
a brief history of the Company, and describes its gradual expansion of mission
from a loosely organized merchant venture to the agent of military control and
territorial governance in India. Part 1I describes the World Bank's shifting de-
velopment policy since its inception, and draws parallels between the Bank's
current mission dilemma and the organizational factors that led to the collapse
of the Company. Finally, Part III evaluates three current recommendations for
the future direction of the World Bank.
I. THE BRITISH EAST INDIA COMPANY
Despite differences in purpose and organization, the Company shares a sim-
ilar background with the World Bank in that both began with a relatively nar-
row scope of purpose which expanded over time due to political and ideological
pressures. Though the Company initially preferred not to replace indigenous
rule with colonial power in pursuit of trade, it faced increasing pressure from
the European powers to do so. Eventually the Company succumbed and was ul-
timately reformed into a British administrative agency in India. This part dis-
cusses the pressures placed on the Company and outlines three major phases in
the development of the Company's purpose: its initial strictly mercantile pur-
pose, its gradual expansion through militarization and territorial conquest, and
finally its decline into the administration of India.
In the fifteenth and sixteenth centuries, Europeans began to voyage and
make territorial discoveries around the world, and to stake claims to those new
discoveries for their homelands. Spain and Portugal led the chase to the spice-
producing East Indies, maintaining that a Papal decree gave them sole right to
use the two known trade routes. 2 Not willing to be left behind, England
searched for its own route to the Indies. When a viable third route failed to
2. John Keay, THE HONORABLE COMPANY: A HISTORY OF THE ENGLISH EAST INDIA COMPANY 8
(1991).
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materialize, the English relied upon new political and ideological theories of
freedom of trade to support their own right to trade abroad:
"[they harbored] a fundamental conviction-that somehow or
other a share of world trade would nonetheless fall to the English.
To the Tudor merchant-adventurer freedom of trade was much
like freedom of conscience.... [J]ust as Rome's presumptuous
claims to a monopoly of Christian truth and authority were no
longer acceptable, so Madrid's claim to the treasures of the Amer-
icas and Lisbon's to the trade of the Indies... were seen as
"insolencyes."3
Spain and Portugal, united at this time under a single monarch, intensified
England's desire to gain access to the Indies by severely restricting the availabil-
ity of spices to English traders in Europe. This move relieved the English of any
obligation that they might have felt under the traditional Anglo-Portuguese al-
liance to utilize Portuguese trade routes.4 Moreover, with heavy mercantilist
pressure to export British goods around the world, the English felt justified,
both by ideology and customary international law, to make the Portuguese
routes to the East Indies "fair game" for their own merchants.
The English Crown had greater interest in developing its North American
and Caribbean holdings, however, and did not want to spare the expense of ex-
ploring the Indies directly.5 Therefore, on December 31, 1600, the Company re-
ceived its first charter under the name "The Company of Merchants of London
trading into the East Indies. ' 6 The name was appropriate, because under this
initial charter the Company did not have the right to hold overseas territories,
but was given exclusive trading rights in the region.7 The Company began, only
a step away from the medieval-style guild, as a loose grouping of English
3. Id. at9.
4. Id. at 10.
5. D.K. Bassett, Early English Trade and Settlement in Asia, in 4 THE EAST INDIA COMPANY 2-3
(Patrick Tuck ed., 1998).
6. KEAY, supra note 2, at 9.
7. The Company, therefore, accepted allegiances from spice-producers on behalf of the
English Crown, and throughout the early seventeenth century, Company emissaries introduced
themselves as "the King of England's Embassadour." Id. at 5, 77.
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merchants who invested in each voyage individually, taking profits from each
individual voyage in return.' Two types of investors materialized: passive inves-
tors, from any social class, who were interested solely in quick and substantial
profits; and more active investors, mostly wealthy merchants, who were inter-
ested in the Indies trade itself and saw investment in the Company as a long term
prospect.9 The management of the Company's affairs was accordingly divided
among two corresponding bodies: the General Court, which gave the passive in-
vestors general voting rights; and the Court of Committees, consisting of the
Governor, Deputy Governor, and twenty-four directors, all of whom were mer-
chants and were elected by the General Court to run the day-to-day operations
of the Company.
0
Investors in the Company were united in pursuit of economic profits. As
evidenced by the first Royal Charter, territorial expansion in the Company's
name was not on its agenda. A new charter written in 1609, however, renewed
the Company's monopoly rights to trade in the Indies and indicated the Crown's
support for its endeavors. This development further demonstrated that the
Crown might, in the future, use the Company for political purposes." Despite
this ominous sign, the Company was initially left to manage its affairs as it saw
fit, and at that time it did not follow the examples set by other Europeans in the
Indies. For instance, the Company did not construct defensive forts in the
Indies, but only small trading outposts, called factories, for collecting spices be-
fore transit to Europe. These factories were not built for colonial or political pur-
poses, but had the primary goal of withholding spices from the market in order
to smooth out price fluctuations that occurred whenever a new shipment arrived
in London. This in turn smoothed the Company's profits over the year. 2
More importantly, the Company did not espouse the strong-arm tactics of
its Dutch rivals of the same name. Instead, it attempted first to work from
8. Id. at 27-28.
9. Id. at 25.
10. Id. at 26.
11. Id. at 39.
12. Id. at 21. It is important to note, however, that at least part of the Company's reluctance to
develop a military presence initially was due to the large expense in arranging and maintaining
warships and defensive structures; as a very new and untried adventure the Company could not
afford to build more than factories, even if it had wished to do so. Bassett, supra note 5, at 3; see also
Peter Marshall, British Expansion in India in the Eighteenth Century: A Historical Revision, in 5 THE
EAST INDIA COMPANYsupra note 5, at 7.
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within the local political institutions in the Indies, currying favor where needed
to gain local protection, full trading rights, and exemption from customs duties
wherever possible. 3 The Company's employees preferred "to bee [neutral] ...
endevouring to doe our business, with a great deale of submission and not much
charge."' 4 Good rapport with local governments was thus imperative to early
Company success. While the Dutch East India Company would require exclu-
sive trading rights with the countries it visited, and enforce that exclusivity with
military strength, "the [English Company] would build no forts... and rarely
land any guns. It deployed no troops in the East Indies and its objectives there
would remain purely commercial .... [H]owever patriotically inclined, they
served the Company, not the King, and they put profits ... before power."' 5
Over time, the mission and practices of the Company changed and ex-
panded to meet the challenges the company faced, embracing militarization and
a governmental role in the Indies. The incessant search for new markets for
English exports pushed the British government toward colonialism, and distinc-
tions between "trade and flag" began to blur for the Company as well, making
territorial acquisition nearly inevitable. 6 The principal impetus for extending
the Company's capabilities to include use of force and defense in the mid-
eighteenth century came from continuing intense rivalries with other European
trading powers such as the Dutch and later the French. Both of these competitor
nations maintained a militarized presence in the East Indies, and both would use
their superior power to gain advantage over the British. For example, on suspi-
cion of inciting mutiny among the Dutch at their fort in Ambon, Company em-
ployees were brought unaware to the Dutch fort, imprisoned, and brutally
tortured without immediately available recourse. 7 The fear that the Dutch
would overrun British factories, or blockade main factories to restrict return
voyages to England, initially prompted the Company to move away from its
13. KEAYsupra note 2, at 18.
14. Bassett, supra note 5, at 10.
15. KEAY, supra note 2, at 34.
16. Peter Marshall, Economic and Political Expansion: The Case of Oudh, in 4 THE EAST INDIA
COMPANY,sUpra note 5, at 209; Rudrangshu Mukherjee, Trade and Empire in Awadh 17 65-1 8 04 , in
4 THE EAST INDIA COMPANY, supra note 5, at 218.
17. When word returned to England of the atrocities committed at Ambon, English outrage
over the incident led to diplomatic reprisals against the Dutch; these reprisals, however, did little
to help the tortured employees. KEAY,supra note 2, at 49.
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relatively pacifist tradition and invest in fortified settlements." The focus, how-
ever, remained on protecting trade, not gaining territorial supremacy.
The symbiotic relationship between the Company and the English Crown
helped pave the way for the Company's militarization. The large profits the
Company brought home to England from its trade in the East Indies, some of
which became "donations" to the royal exchequer, went a long way toward man-
aging the national debt, and many courtiers made handsome profits by investing
in the company's voyages. 9 The Crown was therefore only too happy to issue the
Company a new charter in 1657, giving the Company the right to fortify and col-
onize its establishments, and to transport settlers, stores, and ammunition to
those colonies.2" Soon, the Company acquired the English settlement in Bombay
in 1668, thereby exercising governmental power for the first time in its history.2'
The Company proceeded to set up a government, promulgate laws, attract
settlers, and fortify Bombay to such a degree that its main rivals, the Dutch, were
discouraged from attacking the new settlement.22 At that time, however, the es-
poused justification for owning territory was to supplement and protect revenue
from trade. Indeed, when the Company's governors abroad became too extrav-
agant with their military plans for Bombay, the directors in London wrote that
"our business is to advantage ourselves by trade ... and what government we
have is but the better to carry on and support that trade."23 Though its mission
was undergoing radical change, the Company attempted to maintain its focus as
a trade organization.
Adding to the pressure to militarize, wars originating in the homelands
tended to play out in the East Indies as well. One example occurred when news
of war between Britain and France reached India in 1744. Through their respec-
tive trading companies, France and Britain fought their war in India for fifteen
years, disrupting each other's trade routes and attacking each other's cargo-
laden ships and factories.24 Though not officially soldiers fighting for the British
18. Bassett, supra note 5, at 13.
19. KEAY, supra note 2, at 142; K.N. Chaudhuri, The English East India Company in the 17th and
18th Centuries:A Pre-Modern Multinational Organization, in 4 THE EAST INDIA CoMPANYsupra note
5, at 86.
20. KEAY, supra note 2, at 128.
21. Id. at 131.
22. Id. at 136.
23. Id.
24. Id. at 274.
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Crown, the Company's merchants had tacit government approval for these
actions. The Company thus became more and more a conduit for national
expression, and through its close connections to its royal supporters, the Com-
pany eventually took up the "commercial imperialism" popular among rulers at
the time.25 This shift in thought gave the Company the will and ability to milita-
rize in response to prevailing conditions, and marked an important step in its
evolution toward an administrative agency.
At the same time, the ruling Mughal dynasty in India went into decline and
its formerly strict control over its empire began to decay, leaving a significant
power vacuum in its wake. Insurgent local chieftains began the task of carving
out their own lands independent of the Mughal emperor, and the British, by
then exercising authority over much of the coast of India along the Bay of Ben-
gal, found themselves in the center of political and military turmoil. 26 New for-
tifications and an expanded army were the Company's answer to the power
struggles that threatened to disrupt its India trade. Thus, the decline in Mughal
power coincided with a sudden ability on the part of the British to increase the
Company's military power, leading to the development of large standing armies
in the Company's service. 27
In response to the machinations of other European trading companies and
local warlords, the Company transformed itself into one of the "most effective
military and territorial power[s]" in India, and in the mid-eighteenth century
began to build warships in addition to trading ships. 28 Before the French-
English war, the Company had garrisoned its forts with approximately 500
soldiers; after the war, that number had increased to several thousand.29 Though
this increase in military strength came in response to a European threat, it was
not long before the Company began to use strong-arm tactics against local gov-
ernments when its profits were in danger and its traditional methods of
25. Id. at 142.
26. Id. at 245.
27. Marshall, supra note 12, at 8.
28. KEAY, supra note 2, at 267. Note, however, that these warships were not initially captained by
military men but by the merchants themselves; thus though the Company was more effective than
other regional powers of the time, it lost many easy battles due to inexperience and its core essence
of a merchant-run outfit. Id. at 287.
29. Marshall, supra note 12, at 10.
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diplomacy were unsuccessful.3" Thus, the range of effective tactics at the
Company's disposal multiplied considerably with the addition of fortifications,
maritime power, and land-based forces. 3'
Moreover, the militarization of the Company's settlements pushed them to
expand beyond mere centers of trade into centers of territorial power and influ-
ence, from which it was an easy step for these settlements to become an admin-
istrative power for the British Empire. 2 By the late eighteenth century, the
Company could take by force those commercial concessions it had only been able
to ask for earlier. The Company now followed the lead of its European rivals, in
this case the French, by usurping political control in key regions through the
control of puppet governments dependent entirely upon the Company for mili-
tary and economic support, thereby abandoning its earlier practice of local
appeasement.33
With the governing structure and central purpose of a trading company,
however, the Company was ill-equipped for sovereignty. Regardless, the Com-
pany found itself with territorial control of a large swathe of India called Bengal
by the end of the eighteenth century. The Company, a trading company by de-
sign and culture, was, at its heart, not interested in territorial control as an end in
itself. In fact, the constant use of force required to maintain the borders it con-
trolled interfered significantly with trade and profit. Many times the Company
would leave an enemy only pushed back but not defeated, thus inviting future
30. For example, when political instability in the local government of northern India threat-
ened the Company's security and income from the region, the Company attempted first to coax
political reform from within the local system, but when this course proved unfruitful, the Com-
pany did not hesitate to dispatch its military to force compliance with the reforms. Marshall,supra
note 16, at 197.
31. "Establishing and developing fortified settlements, utilizing maritime power, emphasizing
the idea of fear, and the overt exercise of force, were all components in the evolution of an expan-
sionary ideology among the English in India." I. Bruce Watson, Fortifications and the "Idea" of
Force in Early English East India Company Relations with India, in 4 THE EAST INDIA COMPANY,
supra note 5, at 36.
32. "The timely demonstration of controlled power, both when faced with threats from the
'country' powers of the hinterland and from European rivals on the seafront, helped in the growth
of these settlements beyond mere centres of trade." S. Arasaratnam, Trade and Political Dominion
in South India, 1750-1790, in 4 THE EAST INDIA COMPANY, supra note 5, at 145.
33. KEAY, supra note 2, at 291 ("IThe French] had changed the rules of European involvement in
India. For 150 years the Company had been endeavoring to appease the existing political
hierarchy; in three years [the French] had simply usurped it. The English must either follow suit
or leave the table.").
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trouble from the same quarters again and again.34 Moreover, use of force was
extremely costly, and any money spent to protect its territory sapped the strength
of the Company's trade in other more lucrative areas such as the burgeoning
Chinese tea trade. 5 Though Company servants in India claimed that Bengal
would be highly profitable, the wealth never materialized due to local uprisings
and widespread famine.
Eventually, the conditions in Bengal so drained the Company's finances that
it was forced to approach the British government for a loan. The government
took the opportunity to condition the loans in ways that led to future regulation
and extensive governmental involvement in the internal affairs of the Com-
pany.36 Focused on the uprising in its American colonies, the British government
did not have the substantial resources available to govern India, so instead of
taking control of the territory away from the Company, the British government
"restrained and reformed [the Company] until eventually it ceased to be either
independent or mercantile and became instead a manageable and responsible
administrative service .... [U]nsurprisingly [this change's] implementation
would prove slow, painful, and fraught with misery both for the Company and
the people of Bengal."37
Though it did not want control of Bengal outright, the British government
used the company to gain control there without footing the bill or accepting re-
sponsibility for the dismal condition of the territory. Tales of the "misdemeanors
and oppressions," "peculation and skulduggery" grew at home in England, in-
tensifying the public desire for greater regulation of the Company and ensuring
that it would not be allowed to work its problems out independently." An ulte-
rior motive was also in play, namely that many new traders, and their political
patrons, were eager to break the Company's monopoly on trade in the Indies,
which included the coveted Chinese tea trade.39 In 1784, a bill was passed that
sealed the Company's fate as a quasi-administrative agency of the government
34. Id. at 311.
35. Id. at 362.
36. Id. at 332.
37. Id. at 363.
38. Id. at 382, 383.
39. Ever since the Company showed that a profit could be made by British merchants in the
East Indies, there were intermittent calls to break the monopoly granted by the Company's char-
ter. See id. at 122,451.
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by making the Company's Governor a Crown-appointed position.4" The Com-
pany, which began as an independent mercantile concern, had its rights reduced
by 1813 to a partial monopoly of the China tea trade, and eventually lost its mo-
nopoly altogether by 1843." 1 Having expanded beyond its capabilities as a trad-
ing company to take territorial control in India, the Company lost its
effectiveness in trade, ceasing to exist in that capacity altogether.
II. THE WORLD BANK
The World Bank's history and organizational development have closely mir-
rored that of the Company, despite substantial differences in purpose and struc-
ture, in that both responded to political and ideological pressures from the
developed world by over-expanding their missions. Founded in July 1944, the
World Bank and the International Monetary Fund (IMF) were conceived at Bret-
ton Woods to serve as "twin intergovernmental pillars supporting the structure of
the world's economic and financial order."'42 The World Bank is owned and
directed by its member governments, which currently number 183 nations.43 It is
organized primarily as an investment bank dedicated to global development and
poverty reduction. As such, it has redirected an estimated $500 billion from indus-
trialized countries to projects designed to "promote economic and social progress
in developing countries by helping to raise productivity so that their people may
live a better and fuller life. 44 In fact, the World Bank is a group of three investment
banks, each focused on a particular subset of clients in need of development assis-
tance: the International Bank for Reconstruction and Development (IBRD), the
International Development Association (IDA), and the International Finance
Corporation (IFC). The IBRD attends to the needs of states that, though still need-
ing assistance, can support competitive-rate interest payments on their World
Bank loans; the IDA works with the poorest developing countries, lending at very
low rates of interest; and the IFC focuses on assistance to the private sector.45
40. Id. at 390.
41. Id. at 454, 456.
42. DAVID D. DRISCOLL, THE IMF AND THE WORLD BANK: How Do THEY DIFFER? 1 (1988).
43. World Bank statistics are available at its website, at http://www.worldbank.org/about.
44. Adam Lerrick & Allan H. Meltzer, Grants:A Better Way to Deliver Aid, in Quarterly Interna-
tional Economics Report I (Carnegie Mellon Gailliot Center for Public Policy, 2002), available at
http:// www.house.gov/jec/imf/grant.pdf; DRISCOLL, supra note 43, at 2.
45. DRISCOLL, supra note 42, at 3-4.
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While World Bank loans over the last fifty years have been instrumental in
attracting other forms of foreign investment to emerging economies by provid-
ing adequate infrastructure to support such investment, private investment has
significantly outstripped that of the World Bank.46 It is therefore somewhat sur-
prising that the World Bank has garnered as much attention as it has recently,
finding itself in the center of the current economic development debate. The
Bank's evolution as a development institution, however, has consistently high-
lighted our constantly changing understanding of development, its underpin-
nings, and requirements for success. As an institution, the Bank lays bare the
theories and policies of several decades of economic development, as well as set-
backs in the development process.
As a result, the Bank is a primary battlefield for the creation of a new devel-
opment policy that is manageable yet takes into account all that developed
countries have learned about the nature of development thus far. The Bank is
uniquely capable of promoting macroeconomic development, but must be wary
of expanding its mission to include so many non-economic aspects of develop-
ment that it loses effectiveness in meeting its objectives altogether, much as the
East India Company expanded its mission too far to maintain its effectiveness as
a trade entity.
A. Changes in Development Theory and the Expanding Agenda of the World Bank
At its inception, the World Bank's mission was simply stated and straight-
forward: to assist countries decimated by World War II in rebuilding productive
capacity, and to improve the productive facilities of emerging countries in antic-
ipation of future economic growth and international trade.47 Pursuant to this
fundamental principle of promoting open trade, the World Bank initially of-
fered loans intended to reestablish and improve elements of public infrastruc-
ture such as roads and power plants.48 The prevailing development theory of the
time assumed that purely economic measures such as these were all that was nec-
essary to promote open trade; politics, at least in theory, had no place in economic
46. See Jessica Einhorn, The World Bank's Mission Creep, 80 FOREICN AFF. 22, 28 (2001) (noting
that the World Bank has had to contend with the growth of private-capital flows that "were over-
shadowing development assistance and marginalizing the bank's role in all but the poorest
countries"); see also, e.g., Lars Schoultz,supra note 1, at 571.
47. Schoultz,supra note 1, at 538.
48. Einhorn, supra note 46, at 23.
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development.49 This theoretical split between economics and politics was writ-
ten formally into the articles of agreement of the IBRD: "The Bank and its offic-
ers shall not interfere in the political affairs of any member; nor shall they be
influenced in their decisions by the political character of the member or
members concerned. Only economic considerations shall be relevant to their
decisions, and these considerations shall be weighed impartially.""°
The United States, however, as the most powerful member of the World
Bank, often effectively imposed its own foreign policies upon Bank borrowers
with silent, behind-the-scenes influence, leaving the theory of separation of eco-
nomics and politics a fictional pretext in application.5 Thus, early and ongoing
political pressure to influence developing countries' policies and ideology estab-
lished the road toward expansion of the Bank's mission beyond pure economic
infrastructure development.
Though the international community's initial focus was on economic devel-
opment through the Bretton Woods institutions, the Cold War shifted that focus
to the arena of national security, and the World Bank, along with development
economics, received only low-level political interest. 2 The Bank continued with
its infrastructure development programs, however, and during the 1960s and
19 7 0s learned much about the nature of development: Latin America fell prey to
inflation and macroeconomic instability; the South Asian governments displayed
the effects of significant state-led regulatory distortion of markets; and the Bank's
experiences in Africa suggested that its focus on public infrastructure, without
attention to human-resource development and social development, were not suc-
cessful. In short, the World Bank "came to understand the importance of policy."53
49. Schoultz,supra note 1, at 538.
50. Id.
51. Id. at 539; see also Ngaire Woods, The Challenges of Multilateralism and Governance, in THE
WORLD BANK: STRUCTURE AND POLICIES 132, 134 (Christopher Gilbert & David Vines eds., 2000)
(demonstrating that the United States continues to wield considerable influence with the World
Bank: "any sign of displeasure by the U.S. executive director has an almost palpable impact on the
Bank leadership and staff, whether the signal is an explicit complaint or simply the executive di-
rector's request for information on a problem") [hereinafter STRUCTURE AND POLICIES).
52. The obscurity of the National Advisory Council on International Monetary and Financial
Policies, the U.S. executive branch committee responsible for U.S. dealings with the World Bank,
in comparison to the political visibility of the National Security Administration, indicates the
relative lack of interest in the World Bank and the issues it represented during the 1950s and 60s.
Schoultz,supra note 1, at 539, 540.
53. Einhorn, supra note 46, at 23.
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Corresponding to these new lessons in development, mainstream economics
began openly to embrace politics, and the World Bank's lending practices began
to be "justified ... in terms of the character and direction of the development
process."54 Thus, as one commentator notes, "by describing social goals as inputs
rather than results, the bank cleared the path for a cumulative piling on of tasks
over the decades, including issues of governance, participation by the poor, and
anti-corruption."55 Moreover, as knowledge about development grew, poverty
reduction as a focus for development economics established itself firmly on the
political economic map.
56
The activism of the United States Congress in the 1970s further breached the
wall between politics and economics, just as the British government mixed politics
and trade with respect to the East India Company. During that decade, Congress
made many attempts to influence U.S. policy toward the World Bank. Because,
according to its charter the World Bank could not accept earmarked funds, Con-
gress turned to legislation that restricted the decision-making ability of the U.S.
executive directors when considering loans to governments engaged in activities
to which Congress was opposed. 57 For example, Congressional legislation from
this period requires U.S. executive directors to vote against loans to countries that
had expropriated U.S. property without compensation. 51 Particularly significant
for the World Bank's goals and mission, the 94th Congress also passed legislation
that forces U.S. executive directors to oppose loans to developing countries with
poor human rights records.59 The Congressional stance on human rights and
World Bank assistance was reaffirmed in 1977, when the 95th Congress passed a
bill linking the new U.S. contributions to the World Bank with the opposition of
the U.S. executive directors to loans to human rights violators. 
6
54. Schoultz, supra note 1, at 537; Christopher L. Gilbert & David Vines, The World Bank: An
Overview of Some Major Issues, in STRUCTURE AND POLICIES,supra note 51, at 10, 15.
55. Einhorn, supra note 46, at 24.
56. Ravi Kanbur & David Vines, The World Bank and Poverty Reduction: Past, Present, and Fu-
ture, in STRUCTURE AND POLICIES, supra note 51, at 87, 89-90.
57. Schoultz, supra note 1, at 546.
58. Id. at 554-55.
59. By the end of the decade, the United States had voted against or abstained from votes con-
cerning 112 loan proposals for human rights reasons. Id. at 559, 564.
.60. "[T]he United States in connection with its voice and vote ... shall advance the cause of
human rights, including by seeking to channel assistance toward countries other than those whose
governments engage in a consistent pattern of gross violations of internationally recognized
human rights." This language indicates the blatant disregard for the anti-politicization language
in Chapter IV of the IBRD articles of agreement set out earlier. Id. at 561.
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The injection of political concerns into World Bank decision-making
through U.S. Congressional legislation indicated the power and persuasive
ability of issue-oriented special interest groups in using the World Bank to create
and modify development policy.6' The successful advocacy of these U.S. groups,
particularly those concerned with human rights, opened the door for NGOs to
influence World Bank development policy today, as their goals dovetailed with
the World Bank's own experience in broadening development.
The 1980s saw a return to faith in openness and trade liberalization in devel-
oped countries, though World Bank rhetoric retained the concept of poverty re-
duction as the primary goal of economic growth and development. 62 The World
Bank also responded to critiques of its performance that pointed to a problem in
rising income inequalities brought on by World Bank lending; as a result, the
World Bank began to include in its mission the development of poverty-stricken
rural and inner-city areas, and the education of the poor.63 At the same time, po-
litical interest in the World Bank continued to increase, especially in the United
States, as the U.S. began to reduce its levels of bilateral foreign aid.'4
The end of the cold war introduced a new wave of rapid changes in devel-
opment theory and World Bank policy. The collapse of communist regimes in
Eastern Europe led to the expectation of increased economic development based
upon free markets and global interdependence; "[i]n short, hope was in the
air."65 The world consequently took a closer interest in the World Bank and its
role in championing the development of emerging economies and their entry
into international commerce. 1989 marked the appearance of the Washington
61. "U.S. policy on an ample variety of economic issues is often the reflection of domestic politi-
cal groups seeking to maximize their benefits or minimize their costs." Id. at 573.
62. Kanbur & Vines, supra note 56, at 91-92.
63. Gilbert & Vines, supra note 54, at 15-16.
64. Today, only five wealthy nations-Denmark, Sweden, Norway, Luxembourg, and the
Netherlands-meet the U.N. target of spending 0.7% of their GNP on aid. Enough Talk, THE
ECONOMIST, Nov. 24 -30, 2001, at 14. "As its own bilateral aid program has shrunk, the United
States has found the World Bank an especially useful instrument for projecting its influence in de-
veloping countries." Stephen Fidler, Who's Minding the Bank?, FOREIGN POL'Y, Sept.-Oct., 2001, at
40,48. As an example, the portion of World Bank paid-in capital attributable to the United States
is approximately $2 billion, with a callable amount of $30 billion that the United States does not
have to contribute unless the World Bank defaults on its own bonds. Jose Angel Gurria & Paul
Volcker, The Role of the Multilateral Development Banks in Emerging Market Economies 10 (2001),
at http://www.ceip.org/files/publications/pub-by-type.asp#anchor.
65. Einhorn, supra note 46, at 26.
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Consensus, encapsulating the development policy of the 1980s with its purpose
"to promote sound money and free trade, to free up domestic markets, and to
encourage policy-makers to go home early and stop interfering with markets."'
The Washington Consensus attempted to distill the lore of developed countries'
free market principles into ten precepts: fiscal discipline, redirection of public
expenditure away from subsidies, tax reform, stabilization of interest rates,
adoption of competitive exchange rates, trade liberalization, encouragement of
foreign direct investment, privatization, deregulation, and enforcement of prop-
erty rights.
67
Despite this optimism, however, the adoption of free trade principles was
not a smooth process, and the World Bank learned further lessons about devel-
opment. The seductive nature of the free market ideology ensured its swift ac-
ceptance among newly developing countries, but it turned out to be a poor
substitute for the all-inclusive ideology formerly communist states left behind.
This problem was exacerbated by the fact that policy makers in developing
countries, chafing at being told what to do, tended to implement only partially
the changes advocated by the Washington Consensus and the World Bank. 68
Moreover, the World Bank was struggling to cope with increased costs amid the
rapid influx of countries requiring its assistance after the fall of the Soviet
Union. 69 These factors together led to another period of difficulty for the World
Bank in the form of the Latin American debt crisis and the Asian financial crisis.
The World Bank emerged from these crises in the late 1990s convinced that
economic development cannot succeed without the support of "good" domestic
policies in an increasing number of areas found to be interdependent with eco-
nomic growth.7' Hence the development of the "Five I's of Economic Reforms,"
focusing development attention on international economic instability, invest-
ment, inequality, institutions, and ideology.71 Implicit in the new set of policy
goals is the realization that poverty and the five I's must be tackled directly, not
66. Joseph E. Stiglitz, Introduction, in STRUCTURE AND PoLIcIEs, supra note 51, at 1.
67. Mois&s Naim, Washington Consensus or Washington Confusion?, FOREING POL'Y, Spr. 2000, at
87, 89.
68. See id. at 90.
69. See Gurria & Volcker, supra note 64, at 7.
70. "It is also clearer now that the recipe for prosperity has many ingredients and that their
exact quantities, mix, and sequencing are not well known." See Naim,supra note 67, at 97.
71. Id. at 9 7-101.
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collaterally through exclusive focus on indicators of economic growth.72 This
rapid proliferation of World Bank interests led to a corresponding rise in the
number of reforms thought necessary, similar to the manner in which the East
India Company built up military capabilities in response to its acquisition of
colonial powers.73 For example, in order to address economic instability and in-
vestment, the World Bank determined that in addition to macroeconomic policy
recommendations, it would also stress an agenda calling for "anticorruption, ef-
fective corporate governance, banking transparency and independence, strong
capital markets, and sufficient social safety nets." In short, the World Bank
began to advocate that a strong legal system was key to successful economic de-
velopment.74 This unprecedented expansion of World Bank goals and of its mis-
sion heralded the rise of conditionality, pursuant to which compliance with the
World Bank's new agendas was a requirement of continued funding. In 1989, an
average of 56 conditions were attached to each and every loan.75
The last several years have seen a continuation of the World Bank's trajec-
tory in expanding its mission. Instead of sustainability of market reform, the
current buzzwords are sustainability of democracy, building upon the theory
devised in the last decade that "it [is] not as much what the Bank does, but to
whom the Bank chooses to lend, that affects the success of adjustment. 7 6 Conse-
quently, the World Bank has built upon its initial legal reform efforts by work-
ing with recipient states to standardize their legal codes through the
72. For example, education and health improvements for the poor allow poor people to work
harder and more efficiently, thereby increasing national productivity and spurring economic
growth. The World Bank, it is argued, should directly focus upon education and health, in this ex-
ample, rather than looking only to indicators of economic growth. See Kanbur & Vines,supra note
55, at 92-95.
73. "The new data [from a crisis] would usually show that the main 'lessons' derived from pre-
vious crises missed some important element. . . whose critical importance had been clearly illumi-
nated by the most recent crisis. It would also show that more reforms would be needed." Naim,
supra note 67, at 91.
74. See also Einhorn,supra note 45, at 29 (noting also that the World Bank has moved on to even
more grand visions of development including "abolishing poverty, embracing global civil society,
giving voice to the poor, and pursuing sustainable growth").
75. Gilbert & Vines, supra note 54, at 24.
76. Francisco H.G. Ferreira & Louise C. Keely, The World Bank and Structural Adjustment: Les-
sons from the 1980s, in STRUCTURE AND POLICIES, supra note 51, at 159, 174; see also Jonathan Isham
& Daniel Kaufmann, How Policies and Institutions Affect Project Performance: Microeconomic Evi-
dence on Aid, Policies, and Investment Productivity, in STRUCTURE AND POLICI Es,supra note 51, at 228,
257 (noting that where recipient states' policies are improving, financing tends to pay off).
JANE RUEGER
development of "best practices" in areas such as banking, accounting, and
securities regulation. 77 At the instigation of the World Bank president, James
Wolfensohn, it has also involved representatives from NGOs, business, labor, re-
ligious, and women's groups, to name a few, in external dialogues about the di-
rection development should take. 78 This in turn has enlarged the cycle of World
Bank mission growth, bringing the World Bank into contact with such diverse
and disparate issues as biodiversity, ozone depletion, narcotics, corruption, and
crime.79 The pressure on the World Bank to take on new issues does not look
like it will lessen in the near future; already, the United States has urged World
Bank assistance, without regard to the suitability of recipient economic or dem-
ocratic policies, to those developing countries that offer it help in its war against
terrorism.8" By going down a similar path, the East India Company became little
more than a governmental arm of the British empire.
B. The Current Debate Over The World Bank Mission
It has been urged several times that the World Bank disband or scale back
its programs, but "[u]nlike old soldiers, international institutions never fade
away.. .[a]ll attempts to downsize them end up by making them bigger."'" The
debate has thus shifted to merely discussing the scope of the World Bank's future
development policies and goals. The current debate reveals two camps: those
who believe that the World Bank should continue to expand its mission as it has,
and those who believe that it is time for the World Bank to return to the basics
of aid for purely economic purposes.
77. Einhorn, supra note 46, at 29-30.
78. Fidler, supra note 64, at 45.
79. See Einhorn, supra note 46, at 32. Interestingly, the World Bank is also being pulled back
into old mission haunting grounds in the form of "postconflict reconstruction." Id.
80. Bribing Allies: The IMF and the World Bank Become Part of America's Anti-Terrorist Arsenal,
THE ECONOMIST, Sept. 29, 2001, at 71. In a recent speech given to the World Economic Forum,
U.S. Secretary of State Colin Powell said "terrorism really flourishes in areas of poverty, despair,
and hopelessness, where people see no future.... We have to show people who might move in the
direction of terrorism that there is a better way." N.Y. TIMES, Feb. 2, 2002, (Late Edition-Final) at
Al. At the same event, Philippine President Gloria Macapagal remarked, "Where there is great
poverty, you will also have the breeding ground for the recruits, for the evil ideologues who spread
terror." L.A. TIMES, Feb. 2, 2002, Part A, Part I (Home Edition), at 3. Given the centrality of pov-
erty reduction to the World Bank's agenda, it is clear that the United States expects the World
Bank to take a strong role in fighting terrorism.
81. ALAN WALTERS, Do WE NEED THE IMF AND THE WORLD BANK? 8 (1994).
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Proponents of the World Bank's current expansionary direction believe that
a holistic approach to development is necessary for success in reducing poverty.
They cite sobering statistics: for example, only one in three World Bank projects
succeeds in improving the standard of living in the target country.82 To remedy
this, these critics believe that the World Bank must expand its reach beyond
macroeconomic policy reform and include promotion of effective institutions to
support such reform, especially in the areas of labor-force education, efficient
telecommunications infrastructure, and a reliable justice system.83 Inherent to
the holistic approach, according to Wolfensohn, is the notion that the World
Bank "cannot adopt a system in which the macroeconomic and financial is con-
sidered apart from the structural, social and human aspects, and vice versa.... 84
In short, all the causes of poverty should be addressed, not just its macro-
economic symptoms,85 and the World Bank must advocate supplanting indige-
nous practices with the theories of developed countries in an ever-increasing
number of areas of governance.
Corruption and its role in underdevelopment is also an important topic for
holistic proponents. Those who follow the holistic approach believe corruption
to be at the very core of underdevelopment, because corrupt governments funnel
aid money away from efficient projects into politicians' pockets.86 It is a small
step from this connection to the conclusion that the current method of attaching
conditionalities to World Bank loans is ineffective and allows corruption to
undermine the World Bank's initiatives. Moreover, the more harsh such condi-
tions become in an attempt to enforce efficiency, the more the World Bank is
seen, especially in the developing world, as the advocate of"new economic colo-
nialism."87 Proponents of the holistic approach, therefore, often suggest a shift to
a system of "democratic pluralism," whereby the World Bank would not man-
date the steps a developing country need follow to qualify for aid, but merely
open a dialogue with the country, outlining several alternatives from which to
choose. The World Bank would not express an opinion on which was the opti-
mal solution, and would not interfere with the country's selection process even if
82. Lerrick & Meltzer, supra note 44, at 1.
83. Nafm, supra note 67, at 93.
84. Id. at 96.
85. Christopher L. Gilbert et al., Positioning the World Bank, in STRUCTURE AND POLICIES, supra
note 51, at 39, 41.
86. Stiglitz, supra note 66, at 3.
87. Id. at 4.
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the country chooses the economically inferior path to development. 8 Those who
favor the holistic approach also advocate closer relationships with NGOs with
expertise in infrastructure vital to development that does not involve economic
policies.
On the other side of the debate, critics of the World Bank's current direction
call attention to what Jessica Einhorn has called a "mission creep," 9 and accuse
the World Bank of over-reaching its clear and manageable mission of economic
development reform. Though these critics admit that development solutions
cannot be limited to macroeconomic reform, they find that the World Bank has
become a one-stop shop for all the development goals of its members, and now
for NGOs' goals as well. Thus, the World Bank's approach to development has
been described as "faddish as skirt lengths and tie widths"9 and "softheaded"
because it has shifted away from a purely analytical approach.9' The prolifera-
tion of World Bank objectives has caused critics to worry that the scope of the
World Bank's engagement in development has become too diffuse, thereby re-
ducing its focus on its primary objective of raising the per capita income in de-
veloping countries.92
Critics also insist that the World Bank's assistance and goals have become
too complex to be readily useful to developing countries.93 Indeed, they suggest
that it is also too complex for the World Bank itself to manage: "[I]ts mission has
become so complex that it strains credulity to portray the bank as a manageable
organization. The bank takes on challenges that lie far beyond any institution's
operational abilities."94 Like the East India Company, which faced political pres-
sures in its declining years, the World Bank also attracts many constituencies
that wish to control it because it has acquired so much knowledge about
88. Id.
89. See generally Einhorn, supra note 46.
90. Naim, supra note 67, at 87; see also Fidler, supra note 64, at 45 ("Critics charge that, under
pressure from NGOs and other interest groups ... Wolfensohn has surrendered the World
Bank's intellectual integrity, rushing to embrace the latest fads in development thinking regard-
less of their substantive merit.").
91. Fidler, supra note 64, at 41.
92. Id. at 47.
93. "Policy makers who had hitherto never heard of the long bond suddenly had to scramble to
understand the impact of debt-equity swaps on their country's fiscal account and their link to for-
eign portfolio flows." Naim, supra note 67, at 92.
94. Einhorn, supra note 46, at 22.
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development. Broadening the World Bank's focus, it is argued, would only en-
hance this effect.9"
Lastly, the critics also contend that developing countries are worse off in sev-
eral ways when the World Bank pursues an expanded mission. First, the intro-
duction of increasing numbers of societal and economic reforms required for
development invokes frustration in developing countries because in essence the
World Bank is creating a paradox: the Bank will only offer development assis-
tance when a country is developed." Second, the investment required for the
World Bank to become an expert in all the areas effecting development, not to
mention related administrative costs, would raise developing countries' cost of
doing business with the World Bank considerably.97 Third, the continually
changing mix of development policies that the World Bank pushes on develop-
ing countries only fosters suspicion of and uncertainty in the development pro-
cess.98 Lastly, some critics worry that despite new dialogue with NGOs, the
voices of developing countries themselves are still not being heard, and their
views on the process are being ignored." Thus critics worry that forced whole-
sale substitution of free trade policies occurs without support from local govern-
ments, and therefore will not assist development effectively.
III. SOLUTIONS
Both critics and proponents of the holistic approach to development have
suggested policy changes with respect to World Bank activity. I discuss three
such theories below.
A staunch critic of the World Bank's current mission expansion, Jessica Ein-
horn proposes several changes that would bring the World Bank closer to its
original mission and goals, but re-oriented toward the economic issues of today.
She suggests that national finance ministers should be given a greater role in
providing the World Bank with direction and reorganization." ° The World
Bank's "core competencies" in economic reform, based on years of experience
95. Id. at31.
96. Naim,supra note 67, at 9 6 ;seealso Einhorn,supra note 46, at 31.
97. Higher interest rates on Bank loans would have to be charged to cover these extra costs.
Fidler, supra note 64, at 48; see also Gurria & Volcker, supra note 64, at 7.
98. Naim,supra note 67, at 91.
99. Woods, supra note 51, at 150.
100. Einhorn, supra note 46, at 34.
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and knowledge, should be enhanced and designated as the primary "product"
the World Bank has to offer.' The World Bank should moreover scale back its
direct involvement with private enterprise in developing states, such as the pro-
vision of micro-credit services, and focus its research ability on the "wholesale"
approach to development through proposing public-sector economic reform. 12
Most importantly, Einhorn notes that for the World Bank to be most effective in
its lending, it must acknowledge that private capital flows have far outpaced
public aid, and make certain that its own lending policies complement and en-
hance the private investment process. 10 3
Einhorn's proposition restores the original macroeconomic focus of the
World Bank's mission, but still requires the World Bank to at least recognize the
new theories of development harvested from its fifty years of experience. It does
not directly respond, however, to the problem identified by supporters of a more
holistic approach to aid, namely that traditional remedies for under-development
have not delivered an adequate success rate. Einhorn argues that the recent dis-
mal record of World Bank projects is due to their unmanageable scope. The
scope became unmanageable, however, precisely because of the realization that
macroeconomic policy reform alone cannot bring about lasting change, much
like the East India Company found that to effectively maintain its trade in the
Indies it had to expand its mission to include colonial rule. Einhorn's suggested
retreat from addressing the myriad other factors of development leaves a gap in
effective aid distribution that must then be filled by other intergovernmental
and nongovernmental agencies, or individual governments. If history is any in-
dication, it is unlikely that such an organization or government would rise to the
task, and even less likely that it would do so effectively. Moreover, Einhorn
seems to envision many agencies working in concert, each responsible for a fac-
tor of development relating to its own individual expertise. The chances of a bu-
reaucratic bog developing are high, and there are no assurances that developed
countries will be willing to spend more on aid through other agencies.
Adam Lerrick and Allan Meltzer advocate scrapping the World Bank's
loan program altogether in favor of a system of grants, especially for the poorest
client states.' ° Instead of giving developing countries loans, saddled with condi-
101. Id.
102. Id.
103. Id. at 34-35.
104. See generally Lerrick & Meltzer, supra note 44.
MANAGING THE EXPANDING MISSION OF THE WORLD BANK 223
tionalities, that so rarely produce effective results, the World Bank would issue
grants for specific projects, expecting the target country to co-pay a portion of
the project cost. They argue that the use of grants would reduce the inhibitive ef-
fect of corruption on the aid process because the World Bank would transfer the
grant money only upon receiving an independent audit confirming that the
project has met certain concrete criteria and objectives.' These grants would
not be any more costly to the World Bank or its developed member governments
than traditional loans; because interest rates on current loans to very poor client
states are so low, the client states effectively are given a gift of approximately the
same proportion as the proposed grant.0 6 The authors argue that grants would
also eliminate a source of debt-load for poor countries, because the money is a
gift, payable when observable progress is made in the specified objectives of the
project. They predict an increase in efficiency of World Bank projects without
additional expense, and, unlike Einhorn, they encourage the World Bank to in-
stitute "a career change from an elegant banker dispensing large volumes of lar-
gesse to a development agency with a gritty and demanding workload."'0 7
Though on its face Lerrick and Meltzer's idea seems to address the issue of
corruption and inefficiency effectively, it is subject to possible politicization. It is
not clear who would determine the success criteria applied to grants nor how
stringent they would be; thus, existing loan conditionalities, detested by develop-
ing countries and derided by developed countries as ineffectual, may merely be
renamed as success criteria for grants. Additionally, though an independent
audit to determine success sounds like an impartial solution, the authors do not
suggest who these independent auditors should be. NGOs have their own
agendas, as would members' finance ministers, and so would politicize the pro-
cess through their involvement.
Christopher Gilbert and David Vines introduce yet another possible direc-
tion for the World Bank: that it transform itself into a "Knowledge Bank."'0 8
This approach is the least directly involved with client state affairs of the three
drawn out here, and expands on Einhorn's suggestion that the World Bank
focus exclusively on areas of its expertise. The authors, however, define the
World Bank's expertise more broadly, to include many of the non-economic
105. Id. at 1.
106. Seeid. at4.
107. Id. at 5-6.
108. Gilbert & Vines, supra note 54, at 10.
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goals and factors of development that the World Bank has attempted to research
and address in recent years. Because the World Bank is still in a position to give
more independent advice than professional consultants, more pragmatic advice
than academics, and more comprehensive advice than NGOs, it should restruc-
ture itself to focus on sharing and disseminating that information in countries
that need it.1"9 The authors also contend that a less hands-on approach to aid is
now possible because, since the end of the Cold War, the World Bank can afford
to disengage from countries that do not follow its advice."'
This argument seems to provide an acceptable middle ground between ad-
dressing the interrelated problems of development and focusing on the World
Bank's core competencies, but would be difficult to implement. The World
Bank, though a more disinterested party than the member governments them-
selves, is still a highly politicized institution, and so would have great difficulty
in disengaging and becoming a repository of knowledge to be tapped at will by
developing governments. The World Bank is especially tied to U.S. interests,
particularly now that the war on terrorism has pushed the United States to exert
pressure on the World Bank to give special aid support to its allies.
CONCLUSION
Though expanding the goals and methods of the East India Company was
a necessary and in some instances beneficial development to protect its trade and
profits, in the end, over-expansion beyond manageable levels destroyed the East
India Company's ability to function as a trading company in India at all. Pres-
sured by the British government's desire to become a colonial power, and by the
ideologies of the developed world that advocated direct replacement of local rule
with European rule, the East India Company reached beyond its mission and
capabilities to play an administrative role in India. Though the World Bank is
an institution with a different constitution, mission, and political economic
environment, the East India Company's example teaches moderation for the
World Bank as it now faces a potentially similar situation of expansion beyond
its realistic capabilities.
The East India Company responded to its political and economic surround-
ings, heavily influenced by imperialism, by expanding its military and territorial
109. Id. at 29-30.
110. Id.
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holdings, but found that it could not maintain effective trading and govern India
at the same time. The World Bank, too, has responded to liberal political eco-
nomic theory by expanding its ministrations to include justice system reforms,
human rights requirements, and many more factors key to development. It may
find, however, that over-expansion to address all the elements of development
limits its own effectiveness in the war against poverty. Moreover, the comprehen-
sive application of "our way or nothing," carried over in modified form from colo-
nial days, may not be the most effective way to assist resistant developing
countries.
To avoid a similar fate to that of the East India Company, the World Bank
must know and respect its institutional limits. It can, however, become an inde-
pendent and international source of leadership by providing theory and insight as
a kind of Knowledge Bank, while at the same time fostering the development of
institutions such as micro-banks that directly influence and improve the daily
lives of citizens in developing countries. Its Knowledge Bank capabilities should
not be limited to macroeconomic policy reform, but, as Gilbert and Vines suggest,
include information the World Bank has gleaned from its many years of experi-
ence, and go a step farther to develop more research and advice concerning re-
forms on a scale that help but do not intimidate the poor who must use them, such
as small-claims courts and government-respected property rights."' Thus the
World Bank would become a genuine source for development theory, suggesting
but not forcing change. Even though indigenous practices may be corrupt or eco-
nomically inferior according to the latest development theories, the World Bank
is likely to have far better success by allowing developing countries to make the
choices themselves based on suggested practices, allowing pressure to make those
changes to come from private investment and increased trade opportunities.
Some excuse the World Bank's "mission creep" because governments have
not come up with a better solution for the complex problem of providing effec-
tive development assistance." 2 Unfortunately, this reaction allows the developed
world to ignore or deny responsibility for the problems the World Bank has
been facing, and delays a search for a more viable solution. Better to accept the
natural limits of the World Bank as an institution, and embrace a realistic divi-
sion of labor between the World Bank and other more nimble and gritty organi-
zations and private entities that can better handle affairs at the action level.
111. See generally Now, Think Small, THE ECONOMIST, Sept. 15, 2001, at 40, 42.
112. See Gurria & Volcker, supra note 64, at 5-7.

